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Abstract 
Though the hypothesis that exchange rate regimes fully predetermine monetary policy in the face of external 
shocks hardly finds any advocates on theoretical ground it has crept in the most of empirical research. This study 
adopts a more discerning empirical approach that looks at monetary policy tools used in order to accommodate 
the recent financial crisis. We investigated the GDP growth in 45 emerging market economies in the most intense 
phase of the crisis and found out that there is no clear difference in the growth performance between countries at 
the opposite poles of the exchange rate regime spectrum. Depreciation cum international reserve depletion 
outperforms the other policy options, especially the rise in the interest rate spread. We discovered certain 
complementarities between the information on the policy option and on exchange rate regime. Taking into 
account non-Gaussian settings, we decided to use quantile regression, which provide in addition, more complete 
picture of relationship between the covariates and the distribution of the GDP growth. 
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Introduction 
One of the most important arguments against a fixed exchange rate regime is the 
necessity of making the stabilization of an exchange rate a primary objective of monetary 
policy. By doing this, monetary authorities lose the autonomy in a sense that monetary policy 
cannot be used in order to stabilize the output or employment (domestic objectives). The 
reasoning is rooted in the so-called trilemma or the impossible macroeconomic trinity: one 
cannot have the exchange rate stability, unfettered capital flows and monetary policy oriented 
toward domestic objectives at the same time
2
. The opponents of flexible exchange rates argue 
that such an arrangement contributes to uncertainty, which has an adverse effect on 
international trade and welfare. 
Both these arguments were succinctly and vividly reported by Bordo and Flandreau 
(2003) as the “policy view” and “transactions costs” view on the links between integration 
                                                 
1
 First version: February 24, 2013. 
2
 For a traditional approach to the trilemma see Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962). For the modern approach 
and economic consequences of the trilemma see, for example, Aizenman et al. (2010), Obstfeld et al. (2005, 
2010). 
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and exchange rate regimes. According to the former, flexible exchange rates foster the 
international adjustment process under nominal rigidities and imperfect factor mobility. The 
latter treats the exchange rate flexibility as a source of “a risk that cannot be diversified away 
and thus tantamount to a distortion preventing full specialization”3. 
Frenkel (1999) aptly pointed out that, even in the face of a gradual process of 
international financial integration, the trilemma does not mean that a country has to choose 
between the exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy: “there is nothing in the existing 
theory, for example, that prevents a country from pursuing a managed float under which half 
of every fluctuation in the demand for its currency is accommodated by intervention and half 
is reflected in the exchange rate” (Frenkel, 1999). Taking his idea a step further, one can argue 
that thanks to an additional monetary policy instrument, i.e. foreign market intervention, it is 
possible to ease the conflict between domestic and external objectives. In other words, even if 
there are no barriers to capital flows, the exchange rate regime per se does not fully 
predetermine the stability of output and exchange rate. 
The global financial crisis has entailed large economic and social costs but at the same 
time provided a unique opportunity (in a sense of a natural experiment) to investigate the 
effectiveness of monetary policy options adopted by emerging market economies in order to 
accommodate adverse external shocks. These economies were different not only in their 
relative crisis resilience, but also in the policy option chosen to neutralize the the impact of 
crisis
4
. 
The purpose of the article is to look at policy options adopted by monetary authorities 
in emerging market countries and to investigate their role in making the global financial crisis 
milder for their economies. The existing studies devoted to the role of monetary factors in 
shaping the relative crisis resilience have been focused on the type of exchange rate regime 
and not on the policy options actually adopted (e.g. see Berkmen et al., 2009, Blanchard et al., 
2010, Tsangarides, 2012)
5
. Our empirical strategy consisted of two complementary steps. 
Firstly, we looked for similarities in monetary authorities’ responses to the global financial 
crisis. The goal was to identify similar emerging market economies in terms of monetary 
policy tools used to accommodate external shocks. This stage of analysis was a missing link 
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 The literature on a choice of exchange rate regime is ample. For a survey see Klein and Shambaugh (2010) or 
Rose (2011). 
4
 For a comprehensive study of emerging markets resilience during the global financial crisis see Didier et al. 
(2012). 
5
 For the sake of clarity, it ought to be emphasized that a lot of other explanatory variables, like the magnitude of 
trade shock, crisis vulnerability, or internal imbalances, were taken into account in these studies. However, they 
had no connections with the actual monetary policy during the first phase of the crisis. 
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between theoretical considerations and empirical research, and it was meant to serve as a 
substitute for the commonly used exchange rate regimes classification. Secondly, we looked 
for differences in the economic growth performance during the most intense phase of the 
crisis between the groups of emerging market economies. This stage was more in line with the 
existing empirical literature, however, our approach was focused more on the effectiveness of 
alternative policy options oriented at crisis mitigation rather than on a sophisticated 
comparison between countries that pegged their currencies with those that floated. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on a role of 
exchange rate regime during the global financial crisis and elucidates our contribution. 
Section 3 outlines the two-step methodological approach adopted. The data and estimation 
results are presented in section 4, while Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Exchange rate regimes and the crisis 
Ghosh et al. (2010) divided the theoretical literature on the choice of exchange rate 
regime into three main categories. The first one is focused on the insulating properties of the 
regimes, constraints they put on macroeconomic stabilization policies, and their role in the 
adjustment processes. The second category investigates the benefits of monetary integration 
in the form of fostering deeper goods and capital markets integration and costs of losing 
monetary policy as an adjustment tool. The third one is related to a debate on an optimal 
stabilization programme: a fixed exchange rate can be used as a precommitment device by a 
central bank trying to impair deeply rooted inflationary expectations and restoring confidence 
in the domestic currency. 
Our paper contributes to the first category of the literature on the choice of exchange 
rate regime. There is no professional consensus on which exchange rate regime is more 
conducive in fostering growth during financial crises. For example, Cúrdia (2009, 2007) 
showed that a fixed exchange rate regime is inferior to other monetary policy rules (Taylor 
type rules and targeting rules, in which a central bank targets at inflation, output and exchange 
rate stability) unless nominal rigidities are low or foreign demand for domestic goods is 
highly flexible. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, Céspedes et al. (2004) showed 
that flexible exchange rates do play a role of a real external shocks absorber even in the 
environment with financial imperfections and balance sheet effects. Therefore, they concluded 
their analysis that “flexible rates are not only Pareto superior to fixed rates, but socially 
optimal”. 
Lahiri et al. (2008) argued that the optimality of an exchange rate regime does not only 
 4 
depend on the type of a shock hitting an economy (real versus nominal), but also on the type 
of a distortion that plagues it (goods markets versus asset markets frictions). They showed that 
under the assumptions of asset markets frictions and flexible prices, the famous “Mundell-
Fleming‘s dictum” is turned on its head, i.e. flexible exchange rate regime is superior if 
monetary shocks prevail and hard peg is optimal if an economy is hit mainly by real shocks. 
Their conclusion is, therefore, that the usefulness of exchange rate fluctuations in absorbing 
shocks hitting the economy is an empirical issue
6
. 
Policy options for emerging market economies during the recent crisis were analysed 
by Ghosh et al. (2009). Their overall conclusion was that “there is no one-size-fits-all 
prescription, and the appropriate policy mix depends on the particular circumstances in each 
country, including a number of trade-offs”. As far as monetary policy is concerned, they 
stressed the importance of the trade-off between the benefits of lower interest rates and a 
depreciated currency for propping up domestic activity and exports against the contractionary 
effects of currency depreciation on unhedged balance sheets. The size of desirable currency 
depreciation depends on such factors as initial overvaluation, the exchange rate regime, 
balance sheet effects and possible regional contagion and systemic implications. 
The empirical evidence regarding the role of exchange rate regimes during the recent 
financial crisis is mixed. Berkmen et al. (2012) searched for an explanation of resilience 
diversity among emerging markets in four groups of factors: (i) trade linkages; (ii) financial 
linkages; (iii) underlying vulnerabilities and financial structure; and (iv) the overall policy 
framework. After examining a plethora of various variables and robustness tests, they 
identified four main variables that explained a substantial fraction of (unexpected) growth 
performance in emerging markets: leverage (defined as a ratio of domestic credit to domestic 
deposits), primary gap, short-term external debt and the exchange rate flexibility. On the one 
hand, they concluded that one of the three preliminary policy lessons from the global financial 
crisis was that “exchange rate flexibility proved important for emerging markets in 
dampening the impact of large shocks”7. And on the other hand, they pointed ut that “the 
benefits of exchange rate flexibility appear limited to moving from a peg toward a more 
flexible regime” and “distinguishing between crawls and floats does not improve the fit”. 
Since this variable was the only one that seemed to matter among alternative monetary policy 
indicators considered, one could conclude that monetary policy did not mattere during the 
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 The other two were that reliance on short-term debt was associated with higher vulnerability and that strong 
fiscal position in tranquility times provided some leeway for countercyclical policy. 
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most adverse phase of the crisis. 
A similar conclusion referring to the significance of an exchange rate regime was 
drawn by Blanchard et al. (2010). Firstly, using the de facto exchange rate regime 
classification adopted by the IMF, they divided their sample (29 emerging markets) into two 
groups: peggers and floaters. Secondly, they checked for an impact of the exchange rate 
arrangement on the unexpected GDP growth over the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter 
of 2009. Their theoretical model was not unambiguous on that issue, as it implied that the 
GDP growth in a country that pegged its currency depended also on whether the Marshal-
Lerner condition was satisfied, on the strength of the balance sheet effect, and on the policy 
tools used in order maintain the peg (the policy rate and reserve decumulation). After 
controlling for the size of a shock, they found out that the growth was on average 2.7 
percentage points lower in a country with a fixed rate regime, but this difference was 
statistically insignificant. 
A different empirical strategy was adopted by Tsangarides (2012) who focused on the 
changes in actual GDP growth in 2008-2009 relative to 2003-2007 in a sample of 50 
emerging market economies. His main finding was that after controlling for the trade 
exposure and financial linkages the choice of exchange rate regime was not an important 
determinant of the growth performance of emerging market economies during the crisis. 
Peggers, however, were faring worse in the recovery period 2010-2011. 
Hutchison et al. (2010) investigated the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the 
GDP growth during earlier financial crises in developing and emerging market economies (83 
“sudden stop” episodes in 66 countries over 1980-2003 were examined). They found out that 
contractionary monetary and fiscal policies during a sudden stop exacerbated its recessionary 
consequences. Moreover, discretionary fiscal expansion alleviated adverse effects of a crisis, 
but monetary expansion had no discernible effect. Although at the time of sudden stops 
countries had relatively rigid exchange rates on average, the exchange rate regime, included 
as a control variable, had no statistically significant effect on output costs of a sudden stop. 
Our paper contributes to the literature focusing on emerging market economies’ 
resilience to the global financial crisis and the role of the exchange rate regime. We agree with 
Blanchard et al. (2010) who argued that in order to find out whether maintaining the exchange 
rate by a country hit by a trade or financial shock is expedient one neede to look at the policy 
tools used, i.e. the policy rate or reserve decumulation and the strength of balance sheet 
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effects the country was trying to avoid.
8
 We develop this argument further and argue that it is 
not the exchange rate regime per se that matters in the crisis resilience, but the specific set of 
policy tools used in order to mitigate the contractionary pressure. Though we do not deny the 
fact that the exchange rate regime can have a certain impact on the monetary policy tools used 
to accommodate external shocks, it by no means fully predetermines the policy response. The 
well-known fear of floating syndrome (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) or a more recently 
identified fear of losing international reserves behaviour (Aizenman and Sun, 2012) should 
induce to caution in research on exchange rate regimes
9
. This, however, seems to be present in 
theoretical literature only, whereas empirical analyses are preformed as if the exchange rate 
regime fully predetermined the policy reactions. The hardly surprising consequence is that 
exchange rate regimes do not matter empirically in explaining the resilience to financial 
crises. Our study departs from such an approach and looks at the policy tools used in order to 
accommodate averse external shocks. The empirical approach adopted in this paper seems to 
be both more consistent with and viable in the light of the theoretical findings and more 
promising in empirical research. Thus, we developed and applied an empirical strategy that is 
consistent with theory and contributes to the explanation of diversity among emerging market 
economies’ resilience to the global financial crisis. Moreover, it allows to solve the puzzle of 
small, if any, significance of exchange rate regime for growth performance during the first 
phase of the crisis. 
 
3. Methodology 
Statistical methods of unsupervised classification were used to identify the actual 
monetary policy options for crisis mitigation. The groups of countries obtained were expected 
to include economies that adopted similar monetary policy options. It was assumed that 
although the number of groups is unknown a priori, it should be neither too small nor too 
large. In the former case the within group heterogeneity would be unduly large, whereas in the 
latter case the regression analysis would become impossible. Under such conditions, it was 
expedient to use various tools to classify the countries and to compare their results. Clustering 
was conducted by means of hierarchical methods in which groups are created recursively by 
linking together the most similar objects (different forms of linkage and different measures of 
distance were taken into consideration). Other methods of division, i.e. k-means method and 
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9
 See also Blanchard et al. (2010b) who stated that the central banks actions in the emerging market economies 
“were more sensible than their rhetoric”. Their point was that central banks which adopted inflation targeting 
paid attention to the exchange rate that went beyond its impact on the declared primary objective, i.e. inflation. 
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partitioning among medodois (PAM) method proposed by Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990), 
were also used. In both cases, after making the initial decision about the desired number of 
groups, objects are allocated in such a way that the relevant criterion is met. For the k-means 
method the allocation of objects should minimize within-group variance. In a case of the PAM 
method at each step of the analysis the representatives of groups (medoids) are selected, and 
then the remaining objects are allocated to the group which includes the closest medoid. This 
method is more robust to outliers than the k-means method, because it minimizes a sum of 
dissimilarities instead of a sum of squared Euclidean distance. The final classification of 
objects is, therefore, the result of the comparison of the results of respective grouping 
algorithms. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of policy options for crisis mitigation the magnitude of 
the unexpected decline in the GDP growth is used. Statistical inference about relations was 
carried out within a framework of quantile regression analysis proposed by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978). In order to present the concept of quantile regression and the method of 
parameters estimation let us consider the following linear regression model: 
iii xy   '  for ni ,...,1      (1) 
where iy  is a dependent variable,  ipii xxx ,...,,1 1'   is a vector of explanatory variables, 
 '...,, 10 p   is a vector of unknown parameters of the model, and i  are independent 
stochastic variables with identical distribution. 
Let 
^^
' iii xyr 





 stand for residuals of the regression model (1). In case of 
classical regression the OLS estimator is obtained by such a choice of parameters that 
minimizes the conditional distribution of the expected value of the response variable, i.e. 
 XYE | . In the case of quantile regression parameters are chosen in such a way that 
conditional quantiles of dependent variables      )(:inf| | yFyXYq XY  are minimized. 
For each quantile 10   such a vector of parameters )(  is obtained by minimizing the 
following criterion: 






 
 0)( 0)(
^^
)()1()(min
 

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i ir r
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The result is the parametric quantile regression: 


 iii xy 
^
'      (3) 
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where ',....,
^
0
^^








 p  is a vector of coefficients that depends on the quantile  , and 
0)|( ii xq

  . Parameters of the model can be interpreted as the marginal change in the  th 
conditional quantile of Y associated with a unit change in appropriate covariate. Kroenker 
(2005) emphasizes that a quantile regression in comparison to an OLS regression attains a 
higher robustness and enables natural interpretation. 
 
4. Data and empirical results 
4.1. Data description 
 Our sample covered 45 emerging market economies (see Table 1). There is no one 
commonly accepted definition of emerging market economies. Generally they include 
countries which have reached a certain minimum level of GDP, have exhibited a relatively 
high rate of growth of GDP, but have small and not very deep financial markets and are 
vulnerable to internal and external forces
10
. To a first approximation these criteria are met by 
middle income economies. Several high income countries, however, are also classified as 
emerging markets, e.g. MSCI Emerging Markets Index covers 21 countries out of which 4 are 
classified by the World Bank as high income economies. According to the World Bank 
classification based on GNI per capita in 2009, our sample consisted of 13 lower middle 
income economies, 19 upper middle income economies and 13 high income economies.  
Table1 
Countries in the sample. 
Algeria Czech Republic Macedonia, FYR Serbia 
Argentina Egypt Malaysia Singapore 
Armenia Estonia Malta Slovenia 
Bolivia Georgia Mexico South Africa 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Hong Kong Moldova Thailand 
Brazil Hungary Morocco Tunisia 
Bulgaria India Pakistan Turkey 
Chile Indonesia Peru Uruguay 
China Israel Philippines Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Colombia Korea, Republic of Poland  
Croatia Latvia Romania  
Cyprus Lithuania Russia  
 
 Countries that adopted the euro before 2009 were also included in the sample. Though, 
as members of the monetary union, they do not pursue independent monetary policies, their 
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 See Pearson website for an interesting comment on the definition of emerging markets or the Economist for a 
felicitous and humorous statement that: “’Emerging markets’ is a useful term precisely because it is imprecise… 
it covers a bewildering range of economies with little in common, except that they are not too rich, not too poor 
and not too closed to foreign capital” (Economist, 2012). 
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performance under common policy conveys interesting information for non-EMU countries in 
Central Europe. Slovakia was excluded from the sample because it adopted the euro at the 
beginning of 2009, which resulted in a related structural change in a monetary framework. 
In all our specifications the growth performance is measured as a difference between 
forecast and actual GDP growth in 2009, hereafter referred to as a GDP forecast error 
(GDP_FE) or unexpected growth performance. It is supposed to measure macroeconomic 
effects of the first phase of the crisis in emerging market economies. To construct this 
variable, we have used IMF’s GDP growth forecasts that were published in the spring 2008 
edition of World Economic Outlook, that is before the most intensive phase of the crisis 
started (IMF, 2008, 2012). With the variable of this kind it is easier to assess effectiveness of 
monetary policy options, which were used to mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis on an 
economy. It was these policies that were changed during the first phase of the crisis, thus the 
difference between projected and actual GDP growth remained in a relatively strong relation 
to the effectiveness of the policy option chosen. Another important factor that potentially 
contributed to that difference was the magnitude of an external economic shock and the 
economy’s vulnerability to such shocks. Some control variables, discussed below, were 
included in the regression to take care of the size of and vulnerability to external shocks. 
Two other important arguments in favour of the chosen dependent variable are as 
follows. First, it automatically corrects for anticipated adjustments in growth, e.g. caused by 
the fact that different countries were in different phases of their business cycles. Second, as 
we used data on annual GDP growth in 2009, we allowed for differences in transmission of 
the global shocks to various economies
11
. Though Blanchard et al. (2010) also focused on the 
difference between the actual and forecast growth, they used the quarterly data. Their sample, 
however, covered barely 29 countries since the data of such frequency are not available for a 
large number of emerging market economies. 
Data on unexpected GDP growth performance in emerging market economies in 2009 
are depicted in Figure 1 (see also Table 3). The difference between forecast and actual growth 
was positive for all countries in the sample, but it was quite varied even for pairs of similar 
(not only in terms of the exchange rate regime) economies like Brazil and Mexico, Indonesia 
and Thailand or the Czech Republic and Poland. The difference ranged from less than 1 
percentage point for China and Morocco to 18 percentage points or more for Baltic States and 
Armenia. 
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 These two arguments were put forward by Berkmen et al. (2009) in the working paper version of their article. 
 10 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
C
h
in
a
M
o
ro
c
c
o
U
ru
g
u
a
y
B
o
li
v
ia
In
d
o
n
e
si
a
In
d
ia
E
g
y
p
t
A
lg
e
ri
a
Is
ra
e
l
T
u
n
is
ia
P
o
la
n
d
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
A
rg
e
n
ti
n
a
B
ra
z
il
K
o
re
a
 R
e
p
u
b
li
c
 o
f
M
a
lt
a
P
h
il
ip
p
in
e
s
P
a
k
is
ta
n
P
e
ru
C
y
p
ru
s
C
h
il
e
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
ia
 F
Y
R
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
la
 R
e
p
. 
B
o
l.
M
a
la
y
si
a
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
M
e
x
ic
o
B
o
sn
ia
 &
 H
e
rz
e
g
o
v
in
a
T
u
rk
e
y
H
u
n
g
a
ry
C
z
e
c
h
 R
e
p
u
b
li
c
S
e
rb
ia
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
C
ro
a
ti
a
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
G
e
o
rg
ia
M
o
ld
o
v
a
R
u
ss
ia
E
st
o
n
ia
L
a
tv
ia
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
A
rm
e
n
ia
GDP_FE
 
Fig. 1. Unexpected GDP growth performance in emerging market economies, 2009. 
Three policy tools were used to extract policy options from the actual behaviour of 
monetary authorities: interest rate spread (SPREAD), exchange rate (E_RATE) and 
international reserves excluding gold (RESERVES). A detailed description of variables and 
sources is presented in Table 2. Since almost all central banks cut their policy rates during the 
crisis, we focused on the changes in difference between the domestic interest rate and the 
interest rate in the euro area
12
. Three-month money market interest rates were used. It was 
assumed that the degree to which the exchange rate was used was reflected in the magnitude 
of depreciation of domestic currency at the most intense phase of the crisis. To calculate the 
currency depreciation nominal effective exchange rates were used. The depletion of 
international reserves was treated as a variable describing the intensity of reserve utilisation to 
neutralize an external economic shock. 
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 Three-month money market interest rates in all major advanced economies sharply decreased in the last 
quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. To a great extent it was the result of coordinated monetary policy 
loosening undertaken by major central banks. There is also some evidence that those banks took into account 
foreign interest rate even before the crisis. For example, Taylor (2009) argued that deviations from optimal 
monetary policy can be explained by the foreign interest rate. Thus, we do not think that treating the euro interest 
rate as a benchmark limits our analysis. Moreover, since it was slightly higher than the U.S. Rate, a potential 
switch to the latter would simply almost uniformly increase interest rate spreads analysed. 
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Table 2  
Variable description. 
Variable Full name Description Source 
GDP_FE GDP forecast 
error 
Forecast GDP growth in 2009 (based on projection 
in April 2008) minus actual GDP growth in 2009. 
World Economic 
Outlook , IMF 
SPREAD Interest rate 
spread 
3-month money market interest rate minus 3-month 
EURIBOR;  
Construction: mean spread for October 2008-
February 2009 minus median spread in January 
2008-August 2008 in percentage points 
IMF; 
for China, Hungary, 
Israel, Macedonia, 
FYR Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Egypt 
national central banks 
E_RATE Exchange rate Nominal effective exchange rate (BIS broad 
measure); for Egypt national currency per SDR; 
Construction: mean value for Oct. 2008-Feb. 2009 
as a percentage of maximal value in Jan. 2008-Aug. 
2008 
Bank of International 
Settlements; 
for Armenia, Bolivia, 
Egypt, Georgia, 
Morocco, Macedonia, 
FYR, Pakistan, Tunisia 
IMF; 
for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Colombia, Venezuela, 
Rep. Bol., Serbia 
national central banks  
RESERVES International 
reserves 
Total reserves minus gold (in US. dollars); 
Construction: mean value for October 2008-
Febraury 2009 as a percentage of maximal value in 
January 2008-August 2008 
International Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
EXPORT Export Share of total exports in GDP in percent World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
DEBT Short term 
external debt 
Share of short term external debt in GDP in percent World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
CA Current 
account 
Share of current account in GDP in percent World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
CREDIT Net domestic 
credit 
Share of net domestic credit in GDP in percent World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
EMP Exchange 
market 
pressure 




















RESERVES
RATEE
SPREAD
EMP
100
ln100
_
100
ln100
100
1ln100
 
 
H_PEG Hard peg Dummy: 1 for countries: with no separate legal 
tender or on currency board 
IMF 
S_PEG Soft peg Dummy: 1 for countries with other conventional 
fixed peg arrangement, pegged exchange rate within 
horizontal bands, crawling peg or crawling band 
IMF 
M_FLOAT Managed float Dummy: 1 for countries on managed floating with 
no pre-determined path for the exchange rate 
IMF 
FLOAT Independent 
float 
Dummy: 1 for countries under independent floating IMF 
 
Since the unexpected GDP growth performance in emerging market economies in 
2009 was not only the result of the policy option adopted at the end of 2008, a set of 
macroeconomic control variables including the ones most often used in the empirical 
literature was added as explanatory variables. The following controls were used (all in per 
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cent of GDP): export volume (EXPORT), short term external debt (DEBT), current account 
(CA) and net domestic credit (CREDIT). A detailed description of variables is provided in 
Table 2. Since these variables were supposed to reflect crisis vulnerability of an economy, we 
used their values at the end of 2007 (an additional advantage is that we avoided potential 
endogenity problems). The more important the exports in a given economy, the more it is 
exposed to disturbances coming from the world economy (trade shocks). Both short-term 
external debt and current account deficit can be treated as proxies for economy’s dependence 
on the inflow of foreign capital. The greater they are, the more the economy is susceptible to 
financial shocks. Net domestic credit, which is the sum of financial sector’s claims both on 
the central government and other sectors of domestic economy, was used to take care of 
countries’ variation with respect to internal balance. 
The size of an external shock was proxied by an additional control variable, i.e. a 
simple index of exchange market pressure, (EMP)
13
 (Table 2). One can reasonably expect that 
the economies exposed to more intense shocks experienced more pronounced decline in the 
economic growth and the attempt to assign this effect to any monetary policy option would be 
incorrect. 
Table 3 
Variables: descriptive statistics. 
 
GDP_FE 
[%] 
SPREAD 
[%] 
E_RATE 
[%] 
RESERVES 
[%] 
EXPORT 
[%] 
DEBT 
[%] 
CA 
[%] 
CREDIT 
[%] 
EMP 
Mean 7.30 2.46 94.15 86.14 50.07 38.56 -2.20 63.83 25.73 
Median 5.47 1.66 97.85 87.56 41.92 7.86 -2.36 55.64 25.65 
Maximum 22.15 11.54 114.83 117.04 217.70 473.79 28.73 224.19 92.66 
Minimum 0.25 -3.24 69.82 40.24 13.36 0.55 -27.16 -3.61 -13.05 
Std. Dev. 5.31 2.92 10.66 15.13 40.26 92.63 11.08 40.83 23.20 
Skewness 1.06 1.16 -0.34 -0.70 2.93 3.42 0.31 1.43 0.85 
Kurtosis 3.58 4.48 2.33 3.87 12.12 14.26 3.61 6.51 4.22 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
 
A set of dummies for de facto exchange rate arrangements were included in the 
regression analysis. To that end the IMF classification was used (IMF, 2009). It reports the 
actual exchange rate regimes at the end of April of 2008, that is before the most intense phase 
of the crisis. Exchange rate regimes were divided into four types (the IMF’s categories 
included in a respective type are given in brackets): hard peg arrangement (no separate legal 
tender, currency board) (H_PEG), soft peg arrangement (other conventional fixed peg, pegged 
                                                 
13
 For more on this index and problems involved in its construction see Klassen and Jager (2011) and Li et al. 
(2006). In this study we used a simple EMP index which has the same weights for all components. Moreover, 
changes in international reserves were scaled by their initial level and not by monetary base. 
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exchange rate within horizontal bands, crawling peg, crawling band) (S_PEG), managed 
floating (manager floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate) (M_FLOAT) 
and freely floating (independently floating) (FLOAT) (Table 2). Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
 
4.2. Monetary policy options and country groups 
The objective of this part of the analysis was to uncover the similarities between 
countries with respect to monetary policy tools used in order to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis. Groups were identified by comparing three variables: nominal effective exchange rate 
(E_RATE), interest rate spread (SPREAD), and international reserves (RESERVES). Since 
RESERVES have greater variability (see Table 3) and, therefore, greater discriminatory power 
than the other two variables, all variables were standardized. 
Groups of countries were determined with the use of hierarchical methods (Ward 
linkage, Euclidean distance), the k-means method and partitioning around medoids (PAM) 
method. All of them yielded very similar structures of groups of countries under the 
assumption that five groups are to be identified: either the composition of groups was the 
same or differences were observed for several objects only (4 or 5 countries). For countries 
which were not unambiguously classified, i.e. Armenia, Korea, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Russia, the division based on the traditional hierarchical method was treated as 
conclusive. The reason for this was the assumption that such a classification of these five 
countries fitted well the regional composition of respective groups. Moreover, the size of 
respective groups was the most similar under this method of division. The final division into 
five groups of countries is presented in Table 4. 
In spite of the relatively clear-cut results of the division into groups, it should be 
noticed that the groups identified were not strongly homogeneous. This can be seen in Figure 
2 which illustrates the distribution of respective variables in groups of countries. Moreover, 
the average silhouette width was 0.29, whereas Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) argued that 
the clear structure is present in the data if the average silhouette width is greater than 0.50. 
Large variability of all variables is characteristic for the first group of countries and for 
SPREAD variable in the fourth group. In the second and fourth groups there are several 
outliers. Descriptive statistics for original variables across the groups of countries are 
presented in Table 5. Box plots of interest rate spread (SPREAD), exchange rate (E_RATE) 
and international reserves (RESERVES) across groups of countries are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Box plots of growth performance (GDP_FE) and exchange market pressure (EMP) index 
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across country groups are presented in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. 
Table 4 
Country groups. 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 
8 13 9 7 8 
Argentina 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Brazil India Algeria 
Armenia Bulgaria Chile Indonesia China 
Bolivia Cyprus Colombia Korea, Republic of Egypt 
Croatia Estonia Czech Republic Pakistan Hong Kong 
Moldova Georgia Hungary Poland Israel 
Russia Latvia Mexico Romania Singapore 
Uruguay Lithuania Philippines Serbia Thailand 
Venezuela Macedonia, FYR Turkey  Tunisia 
 Malaysia South Africa   
 Morocco    
 Malta    
 Peru    
 Slovenia    
 
Table 5  
Descriptive statistics across country groups. 
  GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 
G
D
P
_
F
E
 Mean 9.34 9.83 6.48 5.20 3.92 
Median 8.82 8.38 5.44 4.04 2.69 
Maximum 22.15 20.34 9.35 11.32 7.91 
Minimum 1.58 0.77 2.85 1.67 0.25 
Std. Dev. 6.80 5.79 2.39 3.48 2.54 
E
M
P
 
Mean 16.30 33.67 25.53 53.06 -1.42 
Median 10.42 29.01 25.65 52.92 0.64 
Maximum 51.38 92.11 36.27 92.66 9.19 
Minimum -7.91 15.37 12.04 29.92 -13.05 
Std. Dev. 19.12 19.76 8.78 20.73 9.19 
S
P
R
E
A
D
 Mean 7.12 0.96 1.80 3.05 0.33 
Median 6.64 1.14 1.64 3.33 0.69 
Maximum 11.54 2.83 3.19 5.44 1.37 
Minimum 3.03 -3.24 0.68 -0.30 -0.84 
Std. Dev. 2.59 1.60 0.85 2.07 0.86 
E
_
R
A
T
E
 Mean 103.99 99.13 81.41 82.46 100.77 
Median 107.19 99.01 81.06 82.67 99.27 
Maximum 114.83 103.26 88.65 89.91 108.54 
Minimum 90.58 95.35 75.79 69.82 95.96 
Std. Dev. 8.01 1.82 4.55 5.95 4.29 
R
E
S
E
R
V
E
S
 Mean 88.37 73.96 97.17 74.67 101.32 
Median 89.63 77.17 96.10 76.99 99.89 
Maximum 99.69 87.74 109.03 86.95 117.04 
Minimum 70.90 40.24 90.49 50.09 93.79 
Std. Dev. 10.18 11.92 5.64 11.11 7.19 
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Fig. 2. Box plot of interest rate spread (SPREAD), exchange rate (E_RATE) and international 
reserves (RESERVES) across groups of countries. 
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Fig. 3. Box plot of GDP growth loss (GDP_FE) across groups of countries. 
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Fig. 4. Box plot of exchange market pressure (EMP) across groups of countries. 
 
A distinctive feature of the first group of countries (Table 4) was a relative increase of 
interest rate spread, a small depletion of international reserves and simultaneous stability of an 
exchange rate (in fact, on average a slight appreciation took place). This group includes 
countries under soft peg (Argentina, Bolivia, Croatia, and Russia) or managed float (others), 
i.e. exchange rate regimes that are called intermediate regimes (see Figure 2 and Table 5). 
Countries in the second group (Table 4) used their international reserves to make the 
adjustment to external shocks less costly in terms of output (Figure 2). While this line of 
defence was characteristic mainly for countries under hard peg arrangement, two economies 
with soft peg (Morocco, Macedonia, FYR) and three under managed float (Georgia, Malaysia, 
Peru) were also included in this group. 
The third group included countries with independent float and one managed floater 
 17 
(Colombia). One can intuitively expect them to allow for depreciation of their currencies and 
this intuition turns out to be correct. At the same time, they were reluctant to use their 
international reserves. Using the result from Aizenman and Sun (2012), one can conclude that 
monetary authorities in these countries revealed the “fear of losing international reserves”, 
which was stronger than the “fear of floating”. Interestingly, as many as six countries in this 
group (Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Mexico, Philippines, and South Africa) out of nine 
were also included by Aizenman and Sun (2012) in their group of countries reluctant to allow 
for reserves depletion
14
. 
A common feature of countries in the fourth group (Table 4) was the policy of reserves 
depletion and depreciation of domestic currency (Figure 2). This group was dominated by 
economies under managed float, but it also contained two independent floaters (Korea and 
Poland). Four countries included in this group (Indonesia, India, Korea and Poland) were 
qualified by Aizenman and Sun (2012) into their group of countries that were not reluctant to 
depreciate their currencies
15
. 
The last group identified comprised of economies that experienced relatively weak 
external shocks. The exchange market pressure index was by a wide margin the lowest for this 
group with its median value close to zero and small variability (Figure 4 and Table 5). 
Monetary authorities in these countries were not forced to accommodate adverse external 
shocks with monetary policy tools: interest rate spreads hardly changed, depreciation was 
absent or its magnitude was limited, and there was no international reserves depletion; in fact 
in several economies reserves even went up and some currencies slightly appreciated. The 
GDP growth loss was on average the lowest in this group (Figure 4). It was a relative 
weakness of external shocks experienced by the countries in this group that contributed to a 
better GDP growth performance (Table 5)
16
. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The other three: Brazil, Hungary and Turkey were either classified as countries with depreciated currencies or 
absent in Aizenman and Sun’s sample. Differences can partly be explained by different methodologies: 
Aizenman and Sun (2012) assumed a threshold level for reserves depletion (10 per cent), whereas in this study 
we use statistical methods to identify country groups. These differences partly result from the sample size: 
Aizenman and Sun’s sample covered 21 emerging markets, whereas our sample is more than twice as numerous 
as theirs. 
15
 The other three (Pakistan, Romania, Serbia) were absent in Aizenman and Sun’s sample. 
16
 An additional factor that contributed to crisis mitigation was a relatively low degree of financial openness in 
half of countries in this group, i.e. in Algeria, China, Thailand and Tunisia. Financial openness was measured 
with Chinn-Ito index. For details on the index see Chinn and Ito (2008). 
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4.3 Regression analyses 
The magnitude of unexpected GDP growth loss was used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of monetary policy options for crisis mitigation that were identified in the previous 
subsection. To that end, alternative versions of quantile regression were constructed. Such a 
regression allows to recover the complete picture of conditional distribution of dependent 
variable for every quantile and is robust to skewed tails and deviations from normality
 17
 
Our benchmark regression model is given by equation (1). It relates the logarithm of 
unexpected decline in GDP growth in emerging market economies with control variables, 
exchange market pressure index, de facto exchange rate regime and groups identified in the 
first stage of our analysis. 
jjGroupjgimejjControlj GROUPREGIMEEMPCONTROLFEGDP   Re20_ln  (1) 
 
where GDP_FEj stands for the GDP forecast error for country j, jCONTROL  is a vector of 
control variables (EXPORT, DEBT, CA, CREDIT) for country j, jEMP  is an exchange 
market pressure index for country j, jREGIME  is a vector of dummies for de facto exchange 
rate regimes for country j, and jGROUP  is a vector of dummies for groups for country j. 
The analysis was divided into two complementary steps. First, various specification of 
regression model (1) were analysed and compared. Thus, the impact of various vectors of 
explanatory variables on unexpected GDP growth performance was assessed. The objective of 
this part was to evaluate the sensitivity of regression models to changes in vector of 
explanatory variables and comparison of alternative specifications in terms of goodness of fit. 
The results of this part of analysis are presented for the median regression which is a special 
case of quantile regression. Next, we focused on the complete set of explanatory variables in 
equation (1) and carried out the analysis of quantile regressions. The results of this part are 
presented for 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 quantiles of conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable, i.e. unexpected GDP growth. Using the bootstrap method 95 per cent confidence 
intervals for parameters were calculated. This allowed to assess whether the effect of 
explanatory variables is stable and significant at different points of the unexpected GDP 
growth conditional distribution. 
Regression results are summarized in Table 6. All regressions are based on variants of 
equation (1). Parameter estimates and their standard errors (given in parenthesis) are 
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 Deviations from normality and skewness of distribution were characteristic for the residuals from the classical 
linear regression model. 
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presented for median regressions
18
. 
Table 6 
Quantile-regression results (for median) using the logarithm of GDP forecast error as a 
dependent variable. 
Specification Regression1 Regression2 Regression3 Regression4 Regression5 
C 
1.327*** 
(0.247) 
1.285*** 
(0.320) 
1.802*** 
(0.347) 
0.194 
(0.452) 
0.224 
(0.452) 
EXPORT 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
DEBT 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
CA 
-0.047*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.010) 
-0.048*** 
(0.012) 
-0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
CREDIT 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
EMP  
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
H_PEG   
0.395 
(0.356) 
 
-0.094 
(0.403) 
S_PEG   
-0.675** 
(0.258) 
 
-0.904** 
(0.337) 
M_FLOAT   
-0.326 
(0.233) 
 
-0.316 
(0.266) 
GROUP_1    
1.284*** 
(0.358) 
1.740*** 
(0.368) 
GROUP_2    
0.924*** 
(0.311) 
1.027*** 
(0.318) 
GROUP_3    
0.909*** 
(0.327) 
0.836*** 
(0.302) 
GROUP_5    
0.623 
(0.487) 
1.110** 
(0.427) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.285 0.286 0.333 0.392 0.481 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.214 0.195 0.185 0.235 0.287 
Sparsity
 
1.956 1.997 2.129 1.847 1.781 
Prob(Quasi-LR 
stat) 
0.001 0.004 0.015 0.002 0.001 
Quasi-LR statistic 17.667 17.367 18.958 25.697 32.725 
Standard errors are in parentheses under each parameter estimate. Quantile regression standard errors are based 
on bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sparsity function is computed with a Kernel method. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Our basic specification in Table 6 includes four control variables only and a constant 
(column 1). Ratios of exports to GDP and current account balance to GDP are both correctly 
signed and statistically significant. Thus, higher exposure to foreign trade and greater 
dependence on foreign capital (more negative current account) result in a greater reduction in 
unexpected economic growth. The other two controls are wrongly signed and insignificant. It 
is slightly surprising in a case of short-term external debt-to-GDP ratio that was statistically 
significant in other studies (e.g. Berkmen et al., 2012 or Blanchard et al., 2010). It is probably 
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 Kernel (Epanechnikov) method was used to estimate sparsity function. The standard errors for the quantile 
estimates were obtained by bootstraping with 1000 replications. 
 20 
because both current account balance and short-term external debt measure at least to some 
extent a similar thing, namely external vulnerability. Moreover, though Berkmen et al. (2012) 
did not include current account in their preferred specification, they admitted that “the current 
account balance is statistically significant even when the exchange rate regime or net open 
position in foreign assets is controlled for, implying that while leverage was the crucial 
financial linkage, the degree of external imbalances was important”. The third reason is that 
we adopted a different estimation technique. The variability of net domestic credit among 
countries seems to have negligible effect, both statistically and economically, on their growth 
performance. 
Adding exchange market pressure index to the regression does not change the results 
significantly (column 2). Though the EMP had a positive impact on unexpected growth 
decline as expected, the effect was very weak. 
The results of a regression that includes dummies for de facto exchange rate regime 
are presented in column 3. The relevant parameters should be interpreted in terms of a 
difference between a given exchange rate regime and a free floating which is treated as a 
reference regime. 
The effect of exchange rate regime on GDP growth performance during the crisis 
seems to be quite weak for countries in the sample. Performance of economies with managed 
float or hard peg did not diverge from that of floaters at any conventionally adopted statistical 
significance levels. Only for countries under soft peg the growth decline was relatively 
weaker, although from the economic point of view this advantage was not large. Its magnitude 
can be illustrated with the following experiment
19
: were Poland under a soft peg arrangement, 
instead of a free float, at the time of the crisis, then ceteris paribus economic growth would be 
greater by 1.4 percentage point. It is interesting to observe that our general conclusion that the 
relation between exchange rate regime and growth performance is relatively weak is in 
accordance with the empirical literature, e.g. Berkmen et al. (2012) also found that the 
benefits of exchange rate flexibility seem to be limited. 
Regression with dummies for groups of countries identified in the previous step of our 
empirical strategy looks more revealing (column 4). There are dummies for each group of 
countries except for the fourth group, which is treated as a reference group. Differences with 
respect to that group are significant both statistically and economically, and the only 
exceptions are the fourth and fifth groups. Again, to illustrate the differences between groups 
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 The results of an analysis of that type should not be interpreted in terms of a forecast. They are only supposed 
to describe the differences between groups. 
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one can carry out a familiar experiment of moving Poland from the reference group to other 
groups and check for the effects
20
. Therefore, were Poland shifted to the group of countries 
that allowed for an increase in the interest rate spread (the first group), the GDP growth would 
fall 7.4 percentage points. If the “target group” was either countries that used their 
international reserves (the second group) or countries that depreciated their currencies (the 
third group), the economic growth would deteriorate by 4.3 and 4.2 percentage points 
respectively. It is worth emphasizing that the last group (the fifth group) was characterized by 
a relatively low exchange market pressure. Since the EMP index was included in the 
regression as a control variable, a certain portion of an identity of the fifth group was 
probably seized by the EMP parameter. Regression without the EMP index looks slightly 
different: instead of an additional growth loss of 2.4 percentage point, Poland would earn 1.1 
percentage points when shifted from the fourth group to the fifth one. The differences 
between other groups, however, were not statistically significant at 5 per cent level, which 
leaves some room for exchange rate regimes as explanatory variables
21
. 
Regression with country groups has an advantage over regression based on de facto 
classification of exchange rate regimes not only on economic ground but also from a 
statistical point of view. An important feature of a model with groups of countries is the 
statistical significance of dummies for groups. Thus, information on similarities between 
countries as to the monetary policy options for crisis mitigation was important to explain 
variability of the differences between projected and actual GDP growth. Moreover, higher R-
squared and adjusted R-squared for the regression with country groups than the one with 
exchange rate regimes lend some support for the former. 
A more thorough picture of monetary policy options for crisis mitigation used by 
emerging market economies can be recovered from the regression that includes both exchange 
rate regimes and groups of countries (column 5). Two key conclusions can be drawn from the 
regression like this. First, no set of variables makes information conveyed by the other 
statistically insignificant. A plausible interpretation is that information on exchange rate 
regime is complementary to and not substitutionary for information on groups of countries 
identified. 
Second, while economic significance of coefficients for dummies for exchange rate 
regimes remained essentially unchanged (the results of the experiment with a change of 
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 See the reservation in footnote 19. 
21
 In order to check the differences between other groups' regressions were run. Each time a different group was 
treated as a reference group. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
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exchange rate regime in Poland do not differ from those based on regression in column 3 by 
more than 0.3 percentage points
22
), coefficients that reflect differences between groups 
increased (the only exception is the coefficient for the third group, which virtually did not 
change). In other words, the inclusion of information on exchange rate regimes contributed to 
an enhancement of differences between groups. For example, if Poland was to be moved to a 
group of countries that allowed for to a relative increase in the interest rate spread (the first 
group), then ceteris paribus the GDP growth would collapse by as much as 13.7 percentage 
points. If the “target group” was countries that either lose international reserves (the second 
group) or accepted depreciation of their currencies (the third group), the growth loss would be 
5.1 or 3.7 percentage points respectively. This time the difference between the fourth and fifth 
group turned out to be statistically significant: if Poland was moved to the fifth group, its 
GDP growth would be lower by about 5.7 percentage points
23
. Moreover, the differences 
between other groups turned out to be more palpable: out of a total of ten pairs of groups five 
were statistically different at 5 per cent level and one at 10 per cent level
24
. This result comes 
mainly from the pairs including the first group: for regressions excluding exchange rate 
regime dummies this group was not different from other groups (except for the fourth group), 
and, after including these dummies, the identity of the first group became sharper. 
Parameter estimates of regression 5 are presented in more detail in Table 7 and Figure 
5. Table 7 provides parameter estimates for quantiles   (0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95) with their 
standard errors, whereas Figure 5 depicts 95 per cent confidence intervals for parameter 
estimates. The results reveal that some variables, i.e. export to GDP ratio, EMP index, nest 
domestic credit and dummies for the third and fifth groups, have similar effect on unexpected 
GDP growth loss for any point of conditional distribution. This, however, is not the case with 
other variables. A given change in current account balance has the stronger impact on GDP 
growth performance, the higher the quantile of conditional distribution. The same holds for a 
dummy for the first group. For a dummy that identifies the second group the opposite 
conclusion holds: the higher the quantile of conditional distribution, the less evident the 
difference between the second group and the fourth group in terms of GDP growth loss. A 
similar conclusion holds for the dummy for soft peg: the reaction of a dependent variable 
becomes weaker as we move to the higher quantiles of conditional distribution. Parameters 
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  For hard peg the difference is 1.6 p.p. but it is statistically insignificant. 
23
 Such an adverse effect of this change is associated with the ceteris paribus reservation. Due to this 
assumption, the EMP index for Poland remains unchanged throughout the experiment. The characteristic feature 
of countries in the fifth group, however, is a low level of this index (see Figure 4). 
24
 Again detailed regression results are not presented here because of space constraint but are available upon 
request from the authors. 
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for two other exchange rate regime dummies, i.e. hard peg and managed float, remain 
insignificant except for the last quantile. The same pattern holds for the external debt although 
its effect on GDP growth loss is also significant for 0.25 and 0.95 quantiles. 
 
Table 7 
Quantile regressions. 
Specification 
Quantile 
5 th 
Quantile 
25th 
Quantile 
50
th
 
Quantile 
75th 
Quantile 
95th 
C 
-0.081 
(0.640) 
-0.098 
(0.661) 
0.224 
(0.451) 
0.604 
(0.446) 
0.475 
(0.473) 
EXPORT 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
DEBT 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
CA 
-0.022* 
(0.012) 
-0.035** 
(0.014) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.041*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.009) 
CREDIT 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
EMP 
0.012 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
H_PEG 
-0.352 
(0.514) 
-0.085 
(0.567) 
-0.094 
(0.409) 
0.302 
(0.366) 
0.963** 
(0.400) 
S_PEG 
-1.752*** 
(0.459) 
-1.237*** 
(0.468) 
-0.904*** 
(0.340) 
-0.755** 
(0.325) 
0.014 
(0.368) 
M_FLOAT 
-0.425 
(0.400) 
-0.353 
(0.388) 
-0.316 
(0.269) 
-0.109 
(0.266) 
0.588* 
(0.307) 
GROUP_1 
0.464 
(0.437) 
1.803*** 
(0.494) 
1.740*** 
(0.368) 
1.996*** 
(0.330) 
1.343*** 
(0.338) 
GROUP_2 
1.336*** 
(0.397) 
0.782* 
(0.451) 
1.027*** 
(0.318) 
0.774** 
(0.303) 
-0.020 
(0.281) 
GROUP_3 
1.184** 
(0.438) 
0.803* 
(0.462) 
0.836*** 
(0.302) 
0.718** 
(0.324) 
0.907** 
(0.337) 
GROUP_5 
1.064** 
(0.503) 
1.174* 
(0.587) 
1.110** 
(0.427) 
0.664 
(0.415) 
0.602 
(0.384) 
Standard errors are in parenthesis under each parameter estimate. Quantile regression standard errors are based 
on bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sparsity function is computed with a Kernel method. * indicate 
statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
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Fig. 5. Quantile coefficients process. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Inconclusive empirical results on an effect of exchange rate regimes on a relative 
resilience of emerging market economies to the global financial crisis, indeed, should not be 
surprising. After all, macroeconomic theory does not imply that an exchange rate regime puts 
firm and strict binding constraints on macroeconomic policy. Neither does it fully 
predetermines which policy option of adjustment to an external economic shock will be 
chosen by monetary authorities. 
Our empirical findings make us even more sceptical about the hypothesis that 
exchange rate regimes, in and of themselves, fully predetermine monetary policy in the face 
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of an external shock. Though this hypothesis hardly finds any advocates dealing with 
theoretical grounds, it has crept into numerous empirical researches. We depart from that line 
of empirical research and propose a more discerning approach that is based on an analysis of 
monetary policy tools used in order to accommodate external shocks. 
The main conclusions are as follows. First, as predicted by macroeconomic theory, we 
found out that monetary authorities in countries under fixed exchange rates were more 
reluctant to allow for depreciation of their currencies when the crisis hit than monetary 
authorities of floaters. There was, however, no clear (statistical) difference in the growth 
performance during the most intense phase of the crisis between countries at the opposite 
poles of exchange rate regime spectrum. Thus, second, it is not enough to look at exchange 
rate regimes when making comparisons between economies’ resilience to external shocks. 
Countries should be rather allocated to a given category according to the policy option used to 
mitigate the crisis. We constructed five such groups. After controlling for the size of a shock 
and external vulnerability, the option of depreciation cum international reserve depletion 
turned out to outperform the other policy options, i.e. either depreciation or reserve depletion, 
and, especially, the rise in the interest rate spread, which was the most costly line of defence. 
Third, there are complementarities between information on group membership and on 
exchange rate regime adopted. Including the latter into the regression analysis allowed to 
sharpen the impact of groups on the growth performance. It is possible that there is something 
like a premium for consistency between the policy option chosen by monetary authorities and 
the prevailing exchange rate regime. This issue, however, requires a more extensive treatment, 
which we leave for future research. 
 Fourth, using quantile regressions, we were able to find out that our results are 
relevant not only for average but for almost all quantiles of conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable (GDP growth performance). This was especially pertinent to the impact of 
policy options on growth: it was relatively stable with the exception of the extreme quantiles. 
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